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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE DEMISE OF STANDING TO As­
SERT FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS-United States v. Sal­
vucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Salvucci l two defendants, John Salvucci 
and Joseph Zackular, were charged with twelve counts of unlawful 
possession of stolen mail. Incriminating evidence, consisting of wel­
fare checks and a checkwriting machine, was seized during a search 
of an apartment rented by Zackular's wife. 2 The search was con'" 
ducted pursuant to a warrant. Defendants filed a motion to sup­
press the evidence on the ground that the search warrant had been 
issued without probable cause. 3 Following the suppression hearing, 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
held that the affidavit supporting the warrant was defective. 4 The 
search was found to be unlawful and defendants' motion to sup­
press was granted. 5 
The prosecution appealed the lower court's suppression order, 
challenging defendants' standing to assert a fourth amendment vio­
lation. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
held that defendants had "automatic ,standing" to challenge the 
constitutionality of the search by virtue of their being charged with 
a possessory offense. 7 The appellate court affirmed the district 
court's holding. 8 
Traditionally, a defendant was required to show some proprie­
1. United States v. Salvucci, 559 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir. 1979), rev'd & remanded, 
448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
2. The Supreme Court stated that Zackular's mother's apartment was searched. 
448 U.S. at 85. 
3. 599 F.2d at 1094-95. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1094. 
6. Id. at 1095. 
7. Id. at 1097. 
8. The fatal defect in the present affidavit is that it does not disclose the 
date of the conversation overheard by the informant in which Zackular 
stated that the checkwriter used to print forged checks was being kept in his 
wife's apartment in Melrose. Without this date, there was no way for the 
magistrate to determine whether the information was sufficiently timely to 
support the warrant. 
Id. at 1096. 
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tary or possessory interest either in the premises searched or the 
items seized before actual standing to assert a fourth amendment 
claim would be conferred. 9 After a demonstration of the requisite 
interest, the court would determine whether the search and sei­
zure were unlawful. If a constitutional violation had occurred, its 
fruits would be barred by the exclusionary rule from admission into 
evidence. 10 
jones v. United States,ll decided in 1960, created an excep­
tion to the traditional standing rule. The First Circuit, following 
jones, held that individuals charged with crimes of possession 
could challenge the admissibility of seized evidence without prov­
ing that their personal fourth amendment rights were violated. 12 
Prior to jones, the exclusionary rule was available only when a de­
fendant showed the requisite possessory interest in the confiscated 
items. 13 When the crime was one of possession, such a showing 
amounted to a confession of guilt. 14 Thus, defendants were forced 
to weigh their fourth amendment rights15 against those granted by 
the fifth amendment. 1s jones eliminated the proof requirement in 
such a situation: individuals charged with possessory offenses "auto­
matically" could challenge the constitutionality of a search and sei­
zure.17 
The First Circuit, though it granted automatic standing to de­
fendants, questioned the vitality of the doctrine in light of a 1968 
Supreme Court decision; Simrrwns v. United States .18 Simrrwns 
held that testimony proffered in support of a motion to suppress 
could not be used against a defendant at trial on the issue of 
9. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Steeber v"United States, 
198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932) . 
.10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (1972) states: "If the motion [to suppress] is granted 
the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hear­
ing or trial." 
11. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
12.599 F.2d at 1097. 
13. Id. 
14. 362 U.S. at 261-62. 
15. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio­
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
16. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself. ..." U.S. CONST. amend. v. 
17. 362 U.S. at 263-64. 
18. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
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guilt.19 Since Simrrwns barred the introduction of pretrial testi­
mony at the trial on the merits, the self-incrimination dilemma that 
prompted the Supreme Court to devise automatic standing was no 
longer a threat. The Supreme Court granted c-ertiorari to United 
States v. Salvucci20 to determine conclusively the effect that 
Simrrwns had on automatic standing. 
The Court ruled that defendants charged with crimes of pos­
session no longer could invoke automatic standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a search and seizure. Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, stated without equivocation that the need for au­
tomatic standing no longer exists. 21 Following Simrrwns, individuals 
were freed from the need to weigh their fourth amendment protec­
tions against those granted by the fifth amendment. Any testimony 
or evidence proffered to assert actual standing cannot be admitted 
at trial. 22 
Justice Marshall, in his dissent to Salvucci, pointed out that, 
although such evidence cannot be admitted at trial, it can be used 
for impeachment purposes. 23 Further, other language in the major­
ity opinion has ramifications far beyond a fourth versus fifth 
amendment dilemma. No longer does a claim to possession of the 
seized good suffice to confer actual standing. The Court focused on 
"not merely whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the 
items seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the 
area searched. "24 The Court has narrowed the class of persons pro­
tected by the fourth amendment to those with the requisite inter­
est in the premises searched, not in the items seized. Objections to 
unreasonable searches and seizures may be raised only by those 
with a legitimate "expectation of privacy" in the premises. 25 
This "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard was devised 
in another Supreme Court decision, Rakas v. Illinois. 26 In that 
case, the police searched a motor vehicle in which defendants were 
passengers and confiscated a rifle and some shells. 27 Defendants 
19. [d. at 394. 
20. 444 U.S. 989 (1979). 
21. United States v. Salvucci, 488 U.S. 83, 95 (1980). 
22. Id. at 89-90. See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 394. 
23. 448 U.S. at 96. 
24. [d. at 93 (emphasis added). 
25. [d. 
26. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
27. [d. at 130. Defendants, charged with armed robbery, were indeed the tar­
gets of the police search. [d. at 169 (White, J. dissenting). 
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contended that they had standing to object to the search and sei­
zure. The majority held that individuals have standing only when 
they have "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place. "28 As mere guests in the automobile, defendants did not 
have a sufficient interest. 29 In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist noted that 
defendants failed to claim a possessory or proprietary interest in 
the seized items.3o In Salvucci, he rejected that prong of the 
standing test: actual standing can be secured only through an ex­
pectation of privacy in the area searched. 31 
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, questioned whether 
anything short of ownership of the searched vehicle would satisfy 
the Rakas test. 32 Construing a privacy interest in the premises to 
mean ownership narrows the class of individuals protected by the 
fourth amendment only to those who hold property. The Salvucci 
decision not only extinguished automatic standing but also heralded 
the demise of actual standing for a number of individuals subjected 
to unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Salvucci's ramifications will become clear when standing is 
placed in a historical perspective. The history of standing thus is 
presented in part II of this note. An analysis of the exclusionary 
rule and its purpose under the fourth amendment is presented in 
part III. In part IV, this note concludes by demonstrating how the 
Supreme Court's narrow definition of fourth amendment standing 
has deprived a number of individuals of the exclusionary rule's pro­
tections. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The ExclUSionary Rule and the Concept of Standing 
In the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States,33 the Supreme 
Court established the exclusionary rule for federal criminal pro­
ceedings. 34 Evidence secured through an unlawful search and sei­
28. Id. at 143. 
29. "They conceded that they did not own the automobile and were simply 
passengers; the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the 
search." Id. at 130. 
30. Id. at 148. 
31. 448 U.S. at 93. 
32. 439 U.S. at 164-65 (White, J., dissenting). 
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
34. In that case, defendant's home was broken into by the authorities and sub­
jected to a warrantless search. Certain of defendant's personal papers were 
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zure resulted in prejudicial error if admitted at trial in federal 
court. 35 In 1961 the Court applied the rule to state court proceed­
ings: "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state 
court. "36 Before a defendant could exclude illegally obtained evi­
dence, he was required to prove that his own fourth amendment 
rights had been violated. This obliged a defendant to show some 
proprietary or possessory interest in what was searched or seized. 37 
If he could demonstrate the requisite interest in both the area 
searched and the item seized, almost all courts granted standing. If 
a defendant could show either, most courts considered him to have 
standing.38 
Prior to Jones, the law was very unsettled about the degree of 
interest a defendant needed to gain standing. In determining the 
sufficiency of a defendant's interest, the courts applied the "some­
times confusing distinctions of the common law on property."39 In 
1934, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual had to be the 
owner, lessee, or lawful occupant40 of the searched premises be­
fore he could challenge the constitutionality of a search and sei-' 
zure. In the Second Circuit, however, a guest or employee who 
dwelled on the premises had standing to object to an unlawful 
search.41 The Second and Tenth Circuits were in disagreement as 
to whether a bailee had the requisite interest to assert standing. 42 
The Second Circuit denied standing to an employee whose desk 
had been subjected to a search. 43 The United States Court of Ap­
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion. 44 Thus, the law concerning standing, at this time, was 
unclear. 
A possessory interest in the item seized also would be suffi­
unlawfully confiscated and admitted into evidence against him at trial on charges of 
lottery offenses. Id. at 386-87. 
35. Id. at 398. 
36. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
37. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261. 
38. Griswold, The Supreme Court 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 152 (1960). 
39. Weeks, Standing To Object In The Field of Search & Seizure, 6 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 65, 66 (1964). 
40. Kwong How v. United States, 71 F.2d 71, 75 (9th Cir. 1934). 
41. Daddio v. United States, 125 F.2d 924, 925 (2d Cir. 1942). 
42. See In re Number 32 E. 67th St., 96 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1938); Lewis v. 
United States, 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1937). 
43. United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944). 
44. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
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cient to achieve standing. 45 As the District of Columbia Circuit 
held in United States v. Jeffers, 46 an objection to the admission of 
evidence could be made on the basis of ownership of the 
unlawfully seized property. This requirement weighed heavily 
upon individuals charged with crimes of possession. "At the least, 
such a defendant has beeri placed in the criminally tendentious po­
sition of explaining his possession of the premises. "47 These sus­
pects were pinioned on the horns of a dilemma and, in the words 
of Judge Learned Hand, could choose only between horns. 48 Indi­
viduals could assert a violation of their fourth amendment rights 
only at the risk of self-incrimination. The courts were wont to read 
this as an involuntary waiver of fifth amendment protections. Hav­
ing voluntarily testified at a suppression hearing, a defendant could 
not object to use of his statements at trial. 49 
In Jones, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this di­
lemma. The Court granted automatic standing in instances where 
the indictment itself charged possession since there "the defendant 
in a very real sense [was] revealed as a 'person aggrieved by an un­
lawful search and seizure.' "50 The Court intended to achieve two 
results by creating automatic standing: To remove the self­
incrimination dilemma;51 and to prevent the prosecution from 
charging a defendant with possession yet asserting that he lacked 
enough of a possessory interest to have standing. 52 Out of concern 
for the plight of such defendants, the Court waived the require­
ment for a showing of actual standing. 53 
To resolve much of the confusion surrounding actual standing, 
45. See Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afl'd, 342 U.S. 
48 (1951); Occinto v. United States, 54 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1931); Belcher v. United 
States, 50 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1931); Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1926). 
46. 187 F.2d 498, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1950), af!'d, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
47. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 262. 
48. In Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932), Judge Hand wrote: 
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of 
contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a posses­
sor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they 
come as victims, they must take on that role with enough detail to cast them 
without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but 
they were obliged to choose one hom of the dilemma. 
Id. at 630. 
49. Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 
567 (1932). 
50. 362 U.S. at 264. 
51. Id. at 262. 
52. Id at 263. 
53. Id. 
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the Jones Court disregarded the property law concepts establishing 
an interest in the premises searched and created a new standard: 
"anyone legitimately on the premises"54 during a search could chal­
lenge the search's legality through a motion to suppress. Thus, 
Jones held that defendants charged with possessory offenses had 
automatic standing to challenge the lawfulness of a search and sei­
zure. In addition, defendants charged with any crime had a suffi­
cient interest in the searched premises to attain actual standing if 
legitimately present during a search. Jones, a guest in a friend's 
apartment, was found by the Court to have been legitimately on 
the premises.55 
This was a far more expansive reading of standing than that es­
tablished by earlier cases that required a showing of ownership or 
lessee status. 56 Thus, Jones was allowed standing on two grounds: 
he had automatic standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
search and seizure because he was charged with a possessory of­
fense; and he had actual standing to object to the actions of the au­
thorities because he was present during the search. 57 Jones dis­
played a sufficient interest in both the premises searched and the 
property seized. When a defendant's case fell outside Jones' param­
eters, however, the defendant was not protected. 
B. Standing After Jones 
Defendants charged with nonpossessory offenses who were not 
legitimately on the premises at the time of the unlawful search still 
were compelled to balance their fourth and fifth amendment rights 
in determining whether to seek actual standing. Those who took 
the stand at the suppression hearing often found their testimony 
used against them at trial. 58 The Court believed that Jones had not 
gone far enough in protecting individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures and; in 1968, handed down the Simrrwns de­
cision: a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to suppress 
was held inadmissible at trial on the issue of guilt. 59 Simrrwns was 
54. [d. at 267. 
55. [d. at 263. 
56. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. 
57. 362 U.S. at 263. 
58. See, e.g., United States v. Airdo, 380 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 913 (1967). Monroe V. Upited States, 320 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 991 (1964). 
59. 390 U.S. at 394. The three defendants, Andrews, Simmons, and Garrett, 
were charged with robbing a federally insured savings and loan association. Garrett 
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influenced by Katz v. United States,60 which completely rejected 
the old property law view of standing. 61 A personal privacy inter­
est, not one of property ownership, was substituted. "For the 
Fourth Amendment protects peopl~, not places[;] ... '[t]he prem­
ise that property interests control the right of a Government to 
search and seize has been discredited.' "62 The principles estab­
lished in Jones thus expanded and the concept of standing wid­
ened. A "personal privacy interest" was all that had to be shown to 
attain actual standing. 63 Any evidence proffered in support of this 
interest was inadmissible on the issue of guilt at trial. . 
This trend, however, slowed by 1969. In that year, the Su­
preme Court decided Alderman v. United States. 64 In that case, 
three defendants were charged with transmitting murderous 
threats through interstate commerce. Defendant Alderisio's place 
of business had been placed under electronic surveillance by the 
authorities. 65 Defendants contended that the tapped conversations 
had been overheard illegally and that their content was inadmissi­
ble against all three suspects. 66 The Court rejected that argument, 
declaring that Alderisio alone had standing. The other defendants 
had not participated in any conversations on the premises, nor did 
they own the building. 67 
Justice Fortas, in his dissent, argued that standing under Jones 
extended to all those individuals who were targets of a search. 68 As 
support he quoted Jones' language: "[i]n order to qualifY as a 'per­
son aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' one must have 
testified at a suppression hearing that the suitcase found on the premises of An­
drews' mother was similar to one he owned. He declared that its content belonged to 
him. His testimony was admitted into evidence at trial. [d. at 380-81. 
60. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). . 
61. The property law concepts are discussed in text accompanying notes 39-44 
supra. 
62. 389 U.S. at 351. Defendant in that case was charged with transmitting wa­
gering information interstate. His conversations, made in a public telephone booth, 
had been tapped by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [d. at 348. 
63. [d. at 351. 
64. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at.171. 
67. [d. at 176. It is interesting to note that two years earlier, in the Katz deci­
sion, the Court rejected the focus on "area" in favor of "personal privacy." 389 U.S. 
at 350. In Alderman, the Court once again returned to a discussion of property inter­
ests. 394 U.S. at 176. 
68. [d. at 205-06 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
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been one against whom the search was directed ."69 He 
would have conferred standing upon all three defendants. 
The majority did not read Jones so literally. As a result, the 
owner of premises under electronic surveillance was given actual 
standing to assert a violation of his fourth amendment rights, even 
if he made no statements. 70 In other words, a property owner was 
granted standing to suppress another person's conversations as well 
as his own. An individual who did not own the premises but who 
was the target of an investigation involving illegal wiretapping, 
however, could not obtain actual standing unless he made state­
ments on the premises. 
The expectation of privacy established in Katz was narrowed 
somewhat. Allowing an owner of the premises to suppress someone 
else's private conversations merely because they were held on his 
property signaled a retreat to the old ownership confines found so 
unwieldy in the past. As Justice Harlan wrote in his dissent in Al­
dennan, "the right to the privacy of one's conversation does not 
hinge on whether the Government has committed a technical tres­
pass upon the premises on which the conversations took place."71 
Attainment of actual standing once more required a showing of 
ownership. . 
Automatic standing, too, was eviscerated. Brown v. United 
States72 heralded its demise, saying that Jones was no longer nec­
essary. Defendants in Brown sought to suppress evidence seized 
from an unlawful search of a store belonging to a coconspirator. 73 
Because possession was a material element of the offense with 
which they were charged, they contended that they had automatic 
standing to object to the actions of the authorities. 74 The Court 
denied them standing, limiting Jones to situations where "posses­
69. [d. at 207 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261). 
70. 394 U.S. at 191 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
71. [d. at 190-91. 
72. 411 U.S. 223 (1973). The three defendants in that case were charged with 
transporting stolen goods and with conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate 
commerce. Defendants Brown and Smith stored the stolen items in a warehouse be­
longing to defendant Knuckles. [d. at 224-25. All three suspects moved to suppress 
the evidence on the ground that the warrant authorizing the search was defective. 
The motion to suppress was allowed only for defendant Knuckles. Brown and Smith 
failed to allege any proprietary interest in the premises searched or the goods seized. 
[d. at 225-26. 
73. [d. at 228. 
74. [d. at 227. 
536 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:527 
sion at the time of the contested search and seizure is 'an essential 
element of the offense . . . charged.' "75 The question whether to 
overrule Jones was reserved for a later date. 76 The Court viewed 
the self-incrimination factor as no longer present: 
[t]he self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones deci­
sion, can no longer occur under the prevailing interpretation of 
the Constitution. Subsequent to Jones, in Simmons v. United 
States, ... we held that a prosecutor may not use against a de­
fendant at trial any testimony given by that defendant at a 
pretrial hearing to establish standing to move to suppress evi­
dence. 77 
Yet such statements still are available to the prosecution for pur­
poses of impeachment. 78 The Court began to challenge the princi­
ple upon which automatic standing was established. 
Actual standing was further narrowed in Rakas, decided in 
1978. 79 Defendants, passengers in an automobile, declared that 
they had actual standing to object to the search of the car since 
they were legitimately on the premises. 8o The Supreme Court de­
clared that the legitimately "on the premises" ground for actual 
standing was too broad, further challenging Jones' viability.81 In­
stead, actual standing existed only when one had "a legitimate ex­
pectation of privacy in the invaded place. "82 The Rakas majority 
then attempted to reconcile its position with Jones by asserting that 
defendant in that instance, who was a guest in another's apartment, 
actually had an expectation of privacy.83 
Justice White, in a lengthy dissent, declared that the Court 
once again had relegated standing to property law definitions. 84 In­
deed, one of the factors that the Rakas majority pointed to in ex­
plaining that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy was that 
he had a key to the apartment. 85 The passengers in Rakas, who 
were denied standing, had no such control over the vehicle in 




78. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
79. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 128. 
80. Id at 132. 
81. Id. at 143. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. at 156-57 (White, J., dissenting). 
85. [d. at 164-65. 
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which they were riding. According to Justice White, nothing short 
of ownership of the automobile would have satisfied the majority's 
expectation of privacy test. 86 
Mter Rakas, actual standing was so constricted that there were 
only three ways to attain it: To own the area searched; to control 
access to that area, as Jones could through possession of a key to 
the searched apartment; or to claim ownership of the seized evi­
dence. 87 Legitimate presence on the property of another, absent 
some control, proved unavailing. 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 88 decided the same day as Salvucci, 
further limited actual standing by making Rakas' requisite expecta­
tion of privacy difficult to establish. In Rawlings, defendant was 
present at the unlawful search of another's home. His companion's 
purse was searched. At her request, he claimed ownership of illicit 
drugs that were in the purse. Charges of possession were brought 
against him, and he attempted to suppress the evidence. 89 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the majority. He as­
serted that defendant bore the burden of proving both that the 
search of the woman's purse was illegal and that he had a legiti­
mate expectation of privacy in the purse. 90 Justice Rehnquist con­
trasted the Rawlings situation with the one in Jones. Rawlings had. 
known the owner of the purse for only a few days, had never be­
fore used the purse to store items, and could not prevent others 
from having access to it. 91 Jones, on the other hand, was a guest in 
an apartment, and he had a key.92 When Rakas and Rawlings are 
read together, it becomes apparent that the grounds to claim actual 
standing have been so narrowly drawn as to require an assertion of 
ownership of the area searched. 
Rawlings' claim to ownership of the drugs proved to be un­
availing. The majority held that, while ownership of the seized 
drugs was one fact to consider in deciding the issue of standing, 
Rakas had rejected adherence to property law concepts in 
determining fourth amendment interests. 93 Therefore, a privacy in­
86. Id. 
87. Comment, Constitutional Law-Searches & Seizures-Standing & Fourth 
Amendment Rights, 46 TENN. L. REV. 827, 845 (1979). 
88. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
89. Id. at 101. 
90. Id. at 104. 
91. Id. at 105. 
92. Although Jones did possess a key to his friend's apartment, he had spent 
only one night there. 362 U.S. at 259. 
93. 448 U.S. at 104. 
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terest in the searched premises tantamount to ownership is re­
quired for actual standing, yet this privacy interest cannot be 
shown by ownership of the seized goods. "'[A]rcane' concepts of 
property law"94 once again govern the determination of actual 
standing. 
In Salvucci, the Court turned to the concept of automatic 
standing. Justice Rehnquist wrote that the self-incrimination di­
lemma that prompted the Jones decision had been obviated by 
Simrrwns. Since any testimony offered in support of a suppression 
motion was inadmissible at trial on the issue ofguilt, Si1?1mons pro­
tected defendants charged with both possessory and nonpossessory 
offenses. 95 The first basis for automatic standing was held no longer 
to exist. 
Another anomaly considered by the Court in Jones was the 
self-contradiction allowed the prosecution in denying standing to an 
individual charged with a possessory offense. 96 Justice Rehnquist, 
in Salvucci, easily dismissed this by stating: "[d]evelopments in the 
principles of Fourth Amendment standing, as well, clarify that a 
prosecutor may, with legal consistency and legitimacy, assert that a 
defendant charged with possession of a seized item did not have a 
privacy interest violated in the course of the search and seizure. "97 
These "developments" were the narrowing of fourth amend­
ment privacy interests solely to the premises searched, not to the 
items seized. Justice Rehnquist dismissed the Jones Court's as­
sumption that possession of a seized item also was sufficient to at­
tain standing. According to Justice Rehnquist, that assumption was 
incorrect. 98 
After Salvucci, an individual charged with a possessory offense 
no longer can assert automatic standing. In order to attain actual 
standing, he must allege a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
premises searched. The self-incrimination and self-contradiction 
problems have been obviated since a declaration of ownership of 
the seized goods is insufficient to confer standing. The dilemma has 
been resolved, but at what cost? 
94. Id. at 105. 
95. 448 U.S. at 90. 
96. 362 U.S. at 263. 
97. 448 U.S. at 88-89. 
98. Id. at 90. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Justice Rehnquist, in Salvucci, stated that the exclusionary 
rule is but one form of remedy for fourth amendment violations 
and, as such, is available only to those whose rights have been vio­
lated. It cannot be asserted vicariously by persons who are third 
parties to a search.99 The remedy is to be afforded only to the vic­
tims of unreasonable searches and seizures. 100 
There are two prevailing schools of thought as to the function 
of the exclusionary rule. Some authorities view it as a means of 
deterring unlawful police actions. 101 Others perceive it as part and 
parcel of the fourth amendment guarantees and thus as an individ­
ual right. 102 Those alleging it to be a deterrent measure argue that 
its purpose is not to redress the injury to the search victim: that 
person's disrupted privacy cannot be restored. Rather, deterrence 
of future unlawful police activity is the purpose behind the rule. loa 
To Justice Rehnquist, the exclusionary rule is but one of many 
methods available to the courts to assure proper police conduct. 104 
The deterrence rationale can be used to come to a very differ­
ent conclusion than that reached by Justice Rehnquist. Contrary to 
Justice Rehnquist's belief, the exclusionary rule can be viewed as 
the sole effective deterrent of unlawful police activity. It should, 
therefore, be applied broadly. Thus the protections of the exclu­
sionary rule need not be limited solely to the victims of unreason­
able searches. Third parties, such as defendants in Rakas and 
Rawlings, also should be able to reap its benefits. To hold other­
wise would allow the authorities to violate one person's privacy in 
order to secure evidence against another. 
99. Id. at 86. 
100. Id. 
101. See, e.g., Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962 DUKE 
L.J. 319; Comment, Evidence-Search & Seizure-Standing to Suppress Evidence 
Obtained by Unconstitutional Search & Seizure, 55 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1957); Com­
ment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search & Seizure, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 
342 (1967); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search & Seizure, 1965 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 488 (1965). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 383. 
102. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Safarik v. United States, 
62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933); Comment, supra note 87, at 827. See also text accompa­
nying notes 107-11 infra. 
103. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). 
104. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
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As Judge Traynor noted in People v. Martin,105 "if law en­
forcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by 
obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its de­
terrent effect is to that extent nullified. "106 California, pursuant to 
its state constitution, goes so far as to disallow the admitting into 
evidence of the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure without 
requiring a showing of standing. 107 
The Supreme Court, which has a more restricted view of the 
exclusionary rule, considers it to be a mere deterrence measure. 108 
The Court has drawn the confines of standing so narrowly as to ap­
ply solely to persons with an ownership interest in the area 
searched. To view the rule as a deterrence measure yet to give 
such a small number of people standing to suppress illegally ob­
tained evidence amounts to a contradiction. 
A. 	 Third Parties and the Exclusionary Rule 
McDonald v. United States109 was decided in 1948. In that 
case, the Court determined that the fruits of an unlawful search 
were inadmissible against both the individual who rented the 
premises and his codefendant. uo Later cases have rejected such an 
application of the exclusionary rule.1l1 No longer can an individual 
challenge the admissibility of incriminating evidence absent a 
showing of standing. He must demonstrate a violation of his own 
privacy before the exclusionary rule can be invoked. u2 Thus, the 
police can circumvent fourth amendment proscriptions by con­
ducting searches against one individual in the hope of securing evi­
dence against his coconspirators. Defendants in Rakas' were indeed 
the targets of an unlawful search. They were passengers in a motor 
vehicle matching the description of a robbery getaway car. Their 
105. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). 
106. [d. at 760, 290 P.2d at 857. 
107. Id. 
108. "In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per­
sonal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 348 (1974). 
109. 	 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
110. 	 Id. at 456. 
Ill. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 223; Alderma.n v. United States, 
394 U.S. at 165; United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
974 (1974); United Stales v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1048 (1974). 
112. United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 240 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1048 (1974). 
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female companions were not suspects to the crime.113 Rakas, 
though, ruled that actual standing is no longer available to individ­
uals legitimately on the premises. u4 Standing is available only to 
those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy tantamount to 
ownership of the premises. The search of the motor vehicle in 
Rakas, arguably unlawful, could not be contested by defendants. us 
Rakas emasculated the exclusionary rule: illegal police activity was 
encouraged, not deterred. U6 
The results reached by those who view the exclusionary rule 
as an individual right guaranteed by the fourth amendment are 
equally inconsistent. Even though these theorists view the right as 
personal to the one asserting it, they still require a showing of a 
proprietary or possessory interest in what was searched or seized 
before the exclusionary rule can be invoked. U7 The case law indi­
cates that an assertion of ownership of the searched premises is 
necessary to demonstrate an interest sufficient to attain standing. u8 
The Supreme Court, therefore, has allowed the fourth amendment 
to apply to a very small number of individuals. If the exclusionary 
rule were included within the amendment as a personal safeguard, 
then many victims of unreasonable searches and seizures would be 
rightless as well as remediless since the protections against unlaw­
ful police activity apply only to the propertied. 119 
H, however, the fourth amendment were to be viewed as a so­
cietal right' to privacy, the exclusionary rule could fulfill its deter­
rence objectives. "[I]f the exclusionary rule follows from the 
Fourth Amendment itself, there is no basis for confining its invoca­
tion to persons whose right of privacy has been violated by an ille­
gal search. "120 Indeed, some commentators have read two rights 
into its language: A personal right to be free from unreasonable 
113. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 130. 
114. ld. at 142. 
115. ld. at 148. 
116. Compare Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith & Hope, 
42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 539 (1963); Comment, supra note 101, at 357; Coinment, 
Search & Seizure: Admissibility of Illegally Acquired Evidence Against Third Par­
ties, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 400,404 (1966). 
117. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954). 
118. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 119; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 
156 (White, J., dissenting). 
119. "Without a showing of an interest in the property or the right to control it, 
they have no standing to suppress the evidence taken from the truck." United States 
v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1974). 
120. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 205 (Fortas, J., concurring in part & 
dissenting in part). 
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searches; and a general right of the citizenry to be free from 
tainted evidence corrupting the functions of the courts. 121 
Eliminating the need for proof of a personal privacy interest would 
further society's objective of excluding the fruits of unlawful 
searches from admission into evidence. Frequently, under the per­
sonal privacy test, no one has the requisite interest to object. 
Whether the exclusionary rule is construed as a deterrence 
tool or as one element of the fourth amendment, it must be ap­
plied broadly to achieve its purpose. As Justice Douglas pointed 
out in his dissent in Irvine v. California,122 "Exclusion of evidence 
is indeed the only effective sanction [to unlawful police 
searches. ]"123 Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's contention,124 it is 
not merely one method of many to be called upon to curtail police 
abuses. The narrow reading of standing evinced by Rawlings and 
Salvucci makes achievement of the deterrence objective impossi­
ble. The true targets of unlawful police activity are barred from 
"vicariously assert[ing]"125 fourth amendment violations. . 
B. Standing After Salvucci 
In Salvucci, Justice Rehnquist asserted that automatic standing 
amounted to a "windfal1"126 to criminal defendants. In United 
States v. Di RE, 127 however, the Court held: 
[w}e have had frequent occasion to point out that a search is not 
to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad 
when it starts and does not change character from its success. 
. . . But the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, 
designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too 
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was 
a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some crimi­
nals from punishment. 128 
Balancing deterrence objectives against the possibility that 
some guilty individuals may go free leads to the absurdity of using 
a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether a constitutional right is 
121. Comment, supra note 101, at 365. 
122. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
123. Id. at 151 (emphasis added) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
124. 448 U.S. at 86. 
125. Id. 
126. [d. at 95. 
127. 332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
128. Id. at 595. 
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applicable. 129 Granting the protections of the fourth amendment 
only to those with a property interest in the searched premises 
permits unlawful searches to be directed against third parties. 
Hence, the victims of unlawful police activity in many instances are 
barred from asserting a constitutional violation. The courts then be­
come participants in a grave injustice to society. 
The Rakas opinion, which established the expectation of pri­
vacy test, was written by Justice Rehnquist. 13o He pointed out that 
defendants "asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in 
the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized. "131 In ap­
plying the Rakas rationale to Salvucci, he disregarded the second 
prong of traditional fourth amendment standing analysis. Possession 
of a seized good was no longer Justice Rehnquist's focus; rather, he 
emphasized a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area 
searched. 132 Possession was held to create" 'too broad a gauge for 
measurement of Fourth Amendment rights.' "133 
If the Salvucci Court has eliminated the second prong of the 
standing test, which it appeared to do despite its dearth of explana­
tion, it is contrary to a lengthy history of case law. 134 Further, re­
jecting possession as a ground for standing eliminates the self­
incrimination dilemma but creates a more serious problem. If 
possession of the seized good is insufficient to confer standing, de­
fendants will not have to take the stand to make such a claim. Nor 
will the police tactics used to obtain the evidence come under judi­
cial scrutiny. The deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule 
is not satisfied by such a narrow definition of standing. 
If, however, a defendant takes the stand in an effort to assert 
the requisite interest in the area searched, Simmons does not pro­
vide complete protection from the self-incrimination threat. Al­
though pretrial testimony cannot be admitted on the issue of guilt, 
129. See, e.g., White & Greenspan, Standing To Object Search And Seizure, 
118 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970). 
130. 439 U.S. at 128. 
131. ld. at 148 (emphasis added). 
132. 448 U.S. at 92. 
133. Id. at 92-93. 
134. See Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d at 498; Gibson v. United States, 149 
F.2d 381 (D.C. CiL), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 724 (1945). 
See also 448 U.S. at 90-91 n.5, where Justice Rehnquist attempted to condition 
the Jeffers holding on both an interest in the premises searched and the property 
seized. On the contrary, the Jeffers case stands for the proposition that an interest in 
the property seized alone is sufficient to confer standing. United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U.S. at 54. See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
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it can be used for impeachment purposes. 135 Justice Marshall, in 
his dissent to the Salvucci decision, declared: "[t]he use of the tes­
timony for impeachment purposes would subject a defendant to 
precisely the same dilemma, unless he was prepared to relinquish 
his constitutional right to testify in his own defense, and would 
thereby create a strong deterrent to asserting Fourth Amendment 
claims. "136 
The Supreme Court earlier had hinted that the use of testi­
mony for impeachment purposes is violative of the fifth amend­
ment. 137 In Miranda v. Arizona,138 the Court held that use of a 
defendant's own statements for purposes of impeachment rendered 
his words self-incriminating. 139 The Jones dilemma still exists. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Salvucci,140 the Supreme Court overruled 
Jones v. United States,141 which allowed defendants charged with 
possessory offenses to automatically challenge an unlawful search 
and seizure. Automatic standing, therefore, is no longer available 
to defendants charged with crimes of possession. To challenge the 
constitutionality of a search and seizure, all individuals, even those 
charged with possessory offenses, must now meet the requirements 
of actual standing. 
The confines of actual standing have been severely restricted 
by Salvucci and Rawlings. Defendants now must allege an intru­
sion upon a legitimate expectation of privacy in order to have 
standing to suppress evidence secured through a fourth amend­
ment violation. This privacy interest must be in the area searched; 
demonstration of an interest in the property seized will prove una­
vailing. Requiring a demonstration of a legitimate expectation of 
135. See Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 
U. CHI. L. REV. 939 (1967). Using testimony for impeachment purposes "undermines 
the policy of deterring unlawful police action. Although the prosecution could not 
use unlawfully obtained evidence in its case in chief such evidence would still be 
useful to it." Id. at 943. Thus, evidence suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search 
and seizure is not completely barred from use by the prosecution. Its effect as an im­
peachment tool can be just as damaging to a defendant as if it were admitted on the 
issue of guilt. 
136. 448 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
137. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 477. 
140. 448 U.S. at 85. 
141. 362 U.S. at 263. 
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privacy in the area searched confers standing only upon those with 
an ownership interest in the seatched premises. Defendants who 
cannot make this showing cannot invoke the exclusionary rule to 
bar the fruits of unlawful police activity from admission into evi­
dence. 
In the two cases before the Supreme Court in 1980, defend­
ants were left remediless despite apparently improper police ac­
tion. In Salvucci, the lower courts found the search unreasonable 
since the warrant lacked probable cause. 142 In Rawlings, the ques­
tion of an illegal detention was never answered due to the Court's 
focus upon defendant's standing. 143 Police activity was suspect in 
both instances, yet the courts were precluded from resolving the 
issue of unreasonableness because defendants were denied standing 
to object. The fruits of possible unlawful police tactics thus were 
admitted into evidence. The deterrence objective of the exclusion­
ary rule was not met. 
Restricting actual standing derogates the fourth amendment to 
a status far below that established by the framers of the Constitu­
tion. Fourth amendment protections can only be invoked by th~ 
propertied few. 
The exclusionary rule is much more than a mere hindrance to 
the admission of relevant evidence. It is the sole effective check 
available to the citizenry against police abuses. In the words of the 
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio,144 "The criminal goes free, if he 
must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a 
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, 
or worse, its disregard for the charter of its own existence. "145 
Katherine E. McMahon 
142. 599 F.2d at 1096. 
143. 448 U.S. at 106. 
144. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
145. [d. at 659. 
